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International cooperation has become a salient feature of EU agencies triggering important legal
questions regarding the scope and limits of the agencies’ international dimension, the nature and effects
of their international cooperation instruments, and their legal status within the EU and on the global
level. This article examines the international dimension of EU agencies by advancing a legal-
analytical blueprint linking EU law to international public law. The principle of institutional balance
and the Meroni doctrine are used as EU law parameters for assessing the agencies’ international
cooperation mandate, powers and actions, whilst the concepts of ‘international agreement’ and
‘international legal personality’ serve as standards for clarifying the legal nature of EU agencies’
international cooperation instruments and their legal status as global actors. Case studies on the
European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex and Europol ‘test on the ground’ the legal-analytical
framework advanced and offer fresh insights into the EU agencies’ international cooperation practice.
Whilst the institutional balance in EU external relations does not prohibit entrusting
certain international cooperation tasks to EU agencies, the application of the Meroni requirements
suggests a limited role for these EU bodies as global actors. Next, the international cooperation
instruments concluded by EU agencies can be legally binding agreements which, as a specific
category of technical-administrative agreements, could still be accommodated within the EU legal
framework. Albeit EU agencies could acquire in theory a derived and functionally limited
international legal personality, none of the three agencies examined has such a legal status
entailing that their international cooperation actions are in principle attributable to the Union.
1 INTRODUCTION
International cooperation has become a salient feature of the EU agencies, being
reflected accordingly in their legal framework and current practice. This article
investigates the international dimension of EU agencies with a view to map an area
characterized by legal ambiguity and disdain.1 Our analysis focuses on what were
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considered the most relevant formal aspects of EU agencies’ international dimen-
sion (i.e. the design of their international cooperation mandate, the legal require-
ments under which EU agencies may pursue international cooperation, the legal
nature and implications of their formal international cooperation instruments, their
legal status as global actors). These issues have not been sufficiently examined while
at the same time raising pressing legal concerns regarding EU agencies’ interna-
tional cooperation.
For this purpose, a comprehensive legal-analytical blueprint linking EU law to
international public law with a view to assessing EU agencies as actors on the
global arena is proposed. The principle of institutional balance and the so-called
Meroni doctrine bear particular importance as EU law parameters for assessing the
agencies’ international cooperation mandate, powers and actions. Furthermore, the
concepts of ‘international agreement’ and ‘international legal personality’ serve as
international law standards for examining the legal status of the EU agencies as
global actors, and the legal nature of their international cooperation instruments.
Case studies on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Frontex and
Europol serve to ‘test on the ground’ our legal-analytical framework and to
illustrate how international cooperation by EU agencies really works. These
agencies have in common a rich potential for international cooperation reflected
in their relevant legal framework and documented by their practice. Additional
factors for choosing these agencies rather than others are: the well-developed
external dimension of the EU policy areas within which these agencies are active;
the features of agencies’ (international cooperation) mandate according to their
founding acts; the characteristics of their international cooperation instruments;2
the peculiarities of an agency allowing it to serve as a case in point as regards the
outer limits and salient legal problems of EU agencies’ international dimension.3
2 BRIEF TOUR D’HORIZON OF EU AGENCIES’ INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION
EU agencies are increasingly interacting in various ways with actors outside the EU
and they are becoming arguably visible actors on the international arena.4
2 The selection sought to cover variations in EU agencies’ international cooperation instruments qua
terminology (agreements and arrangements) and qua legal nature (apparently binding [Europol];
apparently non-binding [Frontex]; not clear [EASA]).
3 I.e. Europol, whose intergovernmental ‘pedigree’ and international cooperation instruments distin-
guish it from other EU agencies.
4 On the international dimension of EU agencies, see A. Ott, EU Regulatory Agencies in EU External
Relations: Trapped in a Legal Minefield Between European and International Law, 13(4) Eur. For. Affairs
Rev. 515 (2008); A. Ott, E. Vos & F. Coman-Kund, EU Agencies on the Global Scene: EU and
International Law Perspectives, in European Agencies In-Between Institutions and Member States 87–122
(M. Everson, C. Monda & E. Vos eds, Kluwer Law International 2014); M. Groenleer & S. Gabbi,
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Interactions take place routinely between the EU agencies and various interna-
tional organizations and third countries or competent authorities from third coun-
tries. Such cooperation ranges from light and informal forms of collaboration (e.g.
common events, exchanges of best practices) to more structured and substantial
cooperation formalized through international agreements or treaty-like
instruments.5
One may discern several closely inter-linked ways in which the international
dimension of the EU agencies materializes in practice.6 First, EU agencies become
involved in the management of the external dimension of their respective policy
area by assisting the EU institutions and the Member States in their relations with
third countries and international organizations. Second, third countries and inter-
national organizations participate in the internal structures of some EU agencies.
Third, EU agencies establish direct cooperation with third countries or third
country authorities and international organizations materialized most importantly
through the conclusion of arrangements and agreements.
In what follows a selective overview of the international cooperation practice
of some agencies is provided. The focus is placed on the formal cooperation
instruments between the EU agencies and their partners, as these are the easiest
to examine from a legal point of view, and they arguably trigger significant legal
consequences. Most EU agencies conclude in practice cooperation instruments
labelled ‘working arrangement’ ‘administrative arrangement’ or ‘arrangement’ with
the competent authorities of third countries and with relevant international orga-
nizations (e.g. Frontex, EASA, EMA). Other EU agencies formalized their rela-
tionships with external partners through instruments called ‘memorandum of
understanding’ or ‘memorandum of cooperation’ (e.g. Eurojust, EMCDDA).
Several agencies concluded international cooperation instruments entitled ‘agree-
ments’, thereby suggesting heavier forms of cooperation from a legal point of view
(e.g. Europol, Eurojust).
If one takes a closer look at the legal framework of the EU agencies, in most
cases their founding acts include general or more detailed provisions regarding
international cooperation. In some cases, the (task) duty or possibility to establish
relations with non-EU actors is mentioned in broad terms.7 In other instances, the
founding acts contain more detailed provisions regarding the agency’s international
cooperation mandate, the instruments used and relevant procedural aspects.8
Regulatory Agencies of the European Union as International Actors. Legal Framework, Development Over Time
and Strategic Motives in the Case of the European Food Safety Authority, 4 Eur. J. Risk Reg. 482 (2013).
5 F. Coman-Kund, Assessing the Role of EU Agencies in the Enlargement Process: The Case of the European
Aviation Safety Agency, 8 Croatian Y. Eur. L. Pol’y 338–340 (2012).
6 Ibid.
7 E.g. Cedefop, EMSA, Eurofund.
8 E.g. EASA, EASO, EBA, Europol, FRA, Frontex.
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The overview of the EU agencies’ international dimension from both a
practical and a legal-formal perspective reveals a complex picture with common
features, but also idiosyncrasies peculiar to individual agencies or groups of
agencies.
3 A LEGAL-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING EU
AGENCIES’ INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
3.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND THE DOCTRINE OF DELEGATION
OF POWERS
Developed gradually in CJEU’s case law9 and enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU, the
principle of institutional balance has been portrayed by scholars as a tool perform-
ing a similar function at EU level to the principle of separation of powers in state
constitutional systems.10 According to Majone, institutional balance requires ‘that
each institution: 1. has the necessary independence in exercising its powers; 2.
must respect the powers of the other institutions; and 3. may not unconditionally
assign its powers to other institutions and bodies’.11 With respect to EU agencies,
institutional balance requires that they do not encroach upon the powers conferred
by the Treaties on the EU institutions.12
The main tool ensuring that EU agencies do not affect the institutional
balance is the delegation of powers doctrine or the so-called Meroni doctrine.13
The delegation of powers doctrine determines the kind of powers which may be
entrusted to EU agencies, as well as the requirements attached to such powers. In
the Meroni cases, the Court established that EU institutions may delegate to
external bodies executive powers that they themselves possess only if such powers
are ‘clearly defined’ and subject to their supervision.14 In the ESMA judgment, the
Court confirmed the application of the Meroni doctrine to EU agencies,15 but, at
9 Some of the landmark cases affirming the principle of institutional balance are Case 9/56 Meroni & Co,
Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, EU:C:1958:7
and Case 10/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, società in accomandita semplice v. High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community, EU:C:1958:8 (the Meroni cases); Case C-70/88 Parliament v.
Council. Radioactive contamination of foodstuffs (Chernobyl), EU:C:1991:373.
10 S. Prechal, Institutional Balance: A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents, in The European Union After
Amsterdam. A Legal Analysis 280 (T. Heukel, N. Blokker & M. Brus eds, Kluwer Law International
1998); J. P. Jacqué, The Principle of Institutional Balance, 41 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 384 (2004).
11 See G. Majone, Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity, 8 Eur. L. J. 327 (2002).
12 See S. Griller & A. Orator, Everything Under Control? The ‘Way Forward’ for European Agencies in the
Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine, 35 Eur. L. Rev. 31 (2010).
13 K. Lenaerts, Regulating the Regulatory Process: ‘Delegation of Powers’ in the European Community, 18 Eur.
L. Rev. 40–49 (1993).
14 Case 9/56, Meroni, 152 and Case 10/56, Meroni, 173.
15 Case C-270/2012 United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (ESMA), EU:C:2014:1, para. 41.
100 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
the same time, it opened the path for quite wide-ranging powers being entrusted
to these bodies.16 According to the Meroni logic as reinterpreted by the CJEU in
ESMA,17 and in light of the principle of institutional balance,18 EU agencies’
powers seem to be acceptable as long as these:
(1) are of executive nature;
(2) are clearly defined, meaning, however, that they stay within the
boundaries of the agency’s broad regulatory framework;
(3) there are criteria and conditions limiting the discretion of the agency,
which entails mechanisms ensuring sufficient oversight by the main EU
institutions;
(4) do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the Treaties on the EU
institutions.19
What seems to matter in terms of institutional balance and in light of the revived
Meroni doctrine is the system of controlling mechanisms on EU agencies’ powers in
order to preserve the system of checks and balances.
The principle of institutional balance and the Meroni requirements are relevant
standards for assessing the overall design and powers of EU agencies. As such they
are also applicable to the agencies’ international cooperation tasks and activities.
3.1[a] Institutional Balance and Delegation of Powers in the EU External Action Area
Whereas various actors are involved in different ways in the Union’s external
action, from Articles 16(6), 17(1) and 21(3) TEU, as well as Article 220 TFEU it
can be inferred that the Council and the Commission are mainly in charge of the
management of Union’s external relations.20 Recently in Case C-660/13,21 the
Court confirmed that the EU external action is based on an institutional system
whereby the Commission exercises executive and management functions and
16 Ibid., para. 44–45. See for a detailed analysis, M. Chamon, The Empowerment of Agencies Under the
Meroni Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: Comment on United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (Short-
selling) and the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanism, 39 Eur. L. Rev. 381–403 (2014).
17 There is no general consensus on the detailed list of requirements which make up the Meroni doctrine;
for an overview of the various Meroni conditions devised in literature, see M. Chamon, EU Agencies:
Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration 187–192 (Oxford University Press
2016).
18 Whereas, conceptually, the principle of institutional balance, being concerned with preserving the
prerogatives of the EU institutions, is different from the Meroni doctrine, in our view, in practice, these
two parameters are tightly connected.
19 ESMA, supra n. 15, paras 44–54, 67 and 84–86.
20 See Ott, supra n. 4, at 521, and European Commission, Vademecum on the External Action of the European
Union, SEC(2011)881/3, 16–19 (2011).
21 Case C-660/13 Council v. Commission, EU:C:2016:616, paras 33–34.
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ensures Union’s external representation, whilst the Council is in charge of policy
making.
Regarding the Union’s binding international agreements, Article 218 TFEU
features a procedure according to which the Council formally decides on the
opening of negotiations, the signing and conclusion of the international agree-
ments, while the Commission, in principle, can only propose and negotiate such
agreements. On this division of tasks, the Court took a rather strict stance relying
on the principle of institutional balance. The issue arose most famously in Case
C-327/91 France v. Commission22 where the Commission invoked a general auton-
omous power to conclude international agreements as a projection of its internal
powers.23 The Court disagreed, arguing that the institutional balance regarding the
Union’s international agreements requires the conclusion of such agreements by
the Council, not the Commission.24 The strict stance taken by the Court seems to
be backed up by Article 218(1) TFEU, suggesting a single procedure for the
negotiation and conclusion of the Union’s international agreements.25
However, the delegation of specific treaty-making powers to the Commission
or other actors should not be ruled out, provided that the prerogatives of the
institutions involved in ‘Article 218 TFEU’ procedure are not affected.26 Thus, a
more flexible view of the institutional balance in external relations has been
embraced by the EU legislator, entrusting limited external relations tasks to the
Commission and to other actors, in particular EU agencies. The most obvious
examples are the financing agreements concluded by the Commission with third
countries and international organizations on the basis of the EU Financial
Regulation.27 A common thread in these cases is that the enabled international
cooperation is ancillary and instrumental to the implementation of the relevant
secondary legislative instruments. One may wonder whether interpreting such
secondary law provisions as allowing legally binding agreements being concluded
by the Commission and the EU agencies entails that the EU legislator distorted the
institutional balance under Article 218 TFEU.
A more pragmatic option could be to consider them as a form of external
administrative action outside the ‘monopoly’ instituted by Article 218 TFEU.
22 Case C-327/91 France v. Commission, EU:C:1994:305.
23 J. Kingston, External Relations of the European Community: External Capacity Versus Internal Competence,
44 Intl. Comparative L. Q. 659–670 (1995).
24 Case C-327/91 France v. Commission, para. 36.
25 J. C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis 87 (Cambridge University Press 2010).
26 See R. Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution. Selected Essays 392–399 (Cambridge University
Press 2014).
27 Arts 58 and 184–189 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 Oct. 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and
repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002, [2012] OJ L 298/1.
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Whereas such administrative agreements should certainly be in line with Article
218 TFEU, the principle of institutional balance would not require maintaining
the prerogatives of the Council and the European Parliament EP) in ‘Article 218
TFEU’ procedure.
Accordingly, a delineation28 could be made between agreements concluded
according to the ordinary procedure laid down in Article 218 TFEU and interna-
tional agreements concluded by the Commission and EU agencies. The first category
embodies the most important legal-political commitments taken by the Union on
the international plane corresponding to a sort of ‘external legislation-making’, and
requiring the participation of the EU institutions which are also involved in the
legislative process.29 The second category features agreements of technical-adminis-
trative nature regarding the implementation of Article 218 TFEU agreements and
EU legislation, and the daily management of EU external policies or the external
dimension of its internal policies.30 In addition to explicit delegation by the legislator,
the competence of the Commission to enact agreements could be based on its role in
ensuring the Union’s external representation under Articles 17 TEU and 220 TFEU,
in combination with its role as the main EU implementing body.31
3.1[b] EU Agencies and Institutional Balance in External Relations
The Treaties are silent as regards the role of agencies in the EU external action
area, but the possibility for EU agencies to pursue international cooperation has
been acknowledged in the Common Approach on EU agencies,32 Unlike the
Commission, EU agencies may get involved in international cooperation as
sectoral actors, as far as necessary to fulfil their core mandate entrusted by the
legislator in a certain policy area. Accordingly, entrusting certain international
cooperation tasks to EU agencies is acceptable, but the Meroni requirements
listed previously and the institutional balance in the EU external action area
must be observed.
It is also maintained that EU agencies can be delegated by an act of secondary
legislation limited powers to conclude binding international agreements inherent
28 For a similar view, see Schütze, supra n. 26, at 392–396.
29 For a parallel between the Union’s international law-making and the making of its ‘internal’ legisla-
tion, see P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law 193–194 (Oxford University Press 2011).
30 See for an analysis of the concept of ‘international administrative agreement’, Coman-Kund, supra n. 1,
at 155–165.
31 Arts 290–291 and 317 TFEU.
32 Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on
Decentralised Agencies of 19 July 2012 (Common Approach on EU Agencies), pt. 25, (19 July 2012),
https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_
approach_2012_en.pdf.
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to the fulfilment of their mandate.33 Similarly to the Commission’s administrative
agreements, such agreements concluded by the EU agencies are a special form of EU
external administrative actionwhich does not automatically disturb the institutional balance
laid down in Article 218 TFEU.34 In this regard, it is essential that: (1) administrative
agreements remain within the core mandate of the agency, and are consistent with
‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements and EU legislation; and (2) the agency is subject to
sufficient supervision and control, ensuring that the powers of the main actors in the EU
external action area (the Commission and the Council) are not affected.
3.2 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DIMENSION
3.2[a] The Concept of ‘International Agreement’
Article 2(1)(a) of each of the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties35
defines a treaty as ‘an international agreement’ concluded in a written form and
governed by international law, regardless of whether it is embodied in one, two or
more instruments and whatever its particular designation. This definition is widely
accepted by the international law scholarship36 and it is also supported by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)37 as reflecting customary international law.
It follows that under international law an essential criterion for assessing the
legally binding character of international instruments is the genuine intention of
the parties to create binding effects governed by international law, regardless of the
name or the form of the instrument.38 Accordingly, one may identify two essential
requirements for an agreement to become binding under international law:
(1) there must be an intention to create legally binding effects;
(2) such effects must be governed by international law.39
However, it is more difficult to assess whether particular agreements fulfil these
requirements.40 The factors most commonly used include the wording and
33 See Schütze, supra n. 26, at 397–399.
34 Ott, Vos & Coman-Kund, supra n. 4, at 91–93 and 115–116.
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States (the 1969 Vienna Convention) and Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organisations or Between International
Organisations (the 1986 Vienna Convention).
36 D. B. Hollis, Defining Treaties, in The Oxford Guide to Treaties 12 (D. B. Hollis ed., Oxford University
Press 2012).
37 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroun v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
Intervening), Judgment, 2002 I. C. J. 303, 263.
38 O. Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Non-binding International Agreements, 71 Am. J. Intl. L. 296
(1977).
39 For more elaborated discussions, see H. G. Schermers & N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law.
Unity Within Diversity 1121–1123 (5th ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011).
40 Hollis, supra n. 36, at 26–28.
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substance, as well as the particular circumstances (context) surrounding the nego-
tiation and conclusion of the instrument.41 Determining the legal nature of inter-
national cooperation instruments requires a careful analysis which entails looking
not only at what the parties state explicitly in the instrument, but also considering
more objective manifestations of intent.42
Things are not different within the European Union. The CJEU stated that
the binding character of an agreement should be established, based on the intention
of the parties as results from the wording of the instrument and the history of
negotiations.43 Moreover, in its Vademecum on the External Action, the
Commission stresses the decisive character of the content of an instrument for
the purpose of determining its legal nature, and warns about a careful drafting in
order to avoid an instrument being considered as legally binding.44
Determining the legal nature of EU agencies’ international cooperation
instruments entails an assessment of their legal framework pertaining to interna-
tional cooperation, including procedural aspects, and an analysis of the content of
their international agreements.
3.2[b] International Legal Personality
International legal personality indicates that an organization can act as a distinct
subject at the international level and is capable of having rights and duties.45
According to the seemingly prevailing view46 international personality is derived
from the creators of the organization, but it may also be implied from the
competence or powers of the relevant entity as laid down in its founding act.47
Accordingly, the following standard requirements should be fulfilled by an orga-
nization with international legal personality:48
(1) it must be ‘a permanent association of states’ (organization);
(2) it must be possible to make ‘a distinction in terms of legal powers and
purposes, between the organization and its members states’ (creators);
(3) the entity must be equipped with ‘legal powers exercisable on the
international plane’.
41 See K. Schmalenbach, Article 2. Use of Terms, in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary
40–41 (O. Dörr & K. Schmalenbach ed., Springer 2012).
42 Hollis, supra n. 36, at 27–28.
43 Case C-327/1991 France v. Commission, para. 15.
44 European Commission, supra n. 20, at 52.
45 Schermers & Blokker, supra n. 39, at 993.
46 Ibid., at 989.
47 Ibid.
48 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 677 (7th ed., Oxford University Press 2008).
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Regarding the question whether agencies and semi-autonomous organs set up by
states and international organizations may acquire their own international legal
personality, no definite answer is provided in the international law literature, while
practice provides different solutions.49 With regard to the organs or agencies of
international organizations specifically, this issue has been called the ‘(in)divisibility
of international legal personality’.50 Two elements appear to be important for such
an entity to claim its own international status: (1) it must have powers which it can
exercise on the international plane;51 and (2) it must have sufficient organizational
and decision-making autonomy so that it can be perceived as an entity detached
from its creators.52According to Brownlie, the higher the degree of autonomy and
legal powers of an agency increase, the more can it be approximated to an
international organization.53
Assuming that post-Lisbon the EU maintains a degree of ‘divisibility’ of its
international legal personality, the EU agencies might qualify for the status of
‘subject of international law with a limited functional capacity’. EU agencies are
explicitly provided with legal personality by their founding regulations, but such
provisions have generally been interpreted as conferring only domestic legal
personality.54 Accordingly, the EU agencies’ international personality and capacity
depend essentially on the degree of autonomy and on the powers exercisable on
the international plane they possess, assessed on a case-by-case basis.
4 THREE CASE STUDIES: EASA, FRONTEX AND EUROPOL
4.1 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
4.1[a] Mandate, Tasks and Instruments
4.1[a][i] EASA
The international dimension of EASA’s mandate is primarily defined in Article 27
of Regulation 216/2008 (EASA Regulation).55 Article 27(1) covers aspects related
to the assistance which EASA should lend to the Union and the Member States in
their relations with third countries. Article 27(2) pertains to the possibility of
49 Ibid., at 61 and 66–67.
50 Schermers & Blokker, supra n. 39, at 994.
51 N. D. White, The Law of International Organisations 30–32 (Manchester University Press 2005).
52 Brownlie, supra n. 48, at 66–67.
53 Ibid., at 61.
54 See G. Schusterschitz, European Agencies as Subjects of International Law, 1 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 163 (2004).
55 Regulation (EC) 216/2008 on Common Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation and Establishing a European
Aviation Safety Agency, and Repealing Counci1 Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002
and Directive 2004/36/EC, OJ L 79/1 (2008).
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establishing direct cooperation with third countries and relevant international
organizations. First, the subject-matter of such direct international cooperation
must remain within the scope of EASA Regulation. Second, EASA’s direct
international cooperation is in principle based on working arrangements which
are subject to a double requirement: (1) they must be in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Treaty, and (2) they must obtain prior approval from the
Commission. According to Article 27(3), EASA is to assist the Member States with
regard to their compliance with international obligations, in particular those under
the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
The international cooperation tasks and activities performed by the Agency appear
to be inherent to its core mandate, which determines both the scope and the limits
ratione materiae of such cooperation. Article 27 in combination with other relevant
provisions in the EASA Regulation indicate quite clearly that EASA does not pursue
international cooperation completely independently, but within the framework of the
EU external aviation policy and in cooperation with the Member States.56
4.1[a][ii] Frontex
Articles 13–14 of Regulation 2007/2004 (the former Frontex Regulation)57 pro-
vided the general legal framework for Frontex’s international cooperation activities,
and indicated the ‘working arrangement’ as the preferred instrument to formalize
direct operational cooperation with partners. All working arrangements: (1) could
only cover issues within the Agency’s mandate, and (2) had to be concluded ‘in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the TFEU’. Moreover, there was a duty
on behalf of the Agency to inform the EP of the working arrangements entered
into.58 Regarding specifically the conclusion of working arrangements with third
countries, the prior opinion of the Commission was required.59 Other important
aspects pertaining to the Agency’s international dimension were the possibility to
deploy liaison officers in third countries, and the possibility to launch and finance
technical assistance projects in third countries.60
Frontex has been recently consolidated and rebranded as the European
Boarder and Coast Guard Agency.61 Regarding Agency’s international dimension,
56 Recital 23 of the Preamble of the EASA Regulation.
57 Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 Establishing a European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L349/1
(2004).
58 Ibid., Arts 13(1) and 14(8).
59 Ibid., Art. 14(8).
60 Ibid., Arts 14 (3)–(5).
61 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the
European Border and Coast Guard and Amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and
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Article 54(2) of Regulation 2016/1624 (the New Frontex Regulation) features a
novelty by subjecting working arrangements with international organizations and
competent authorities from third countries to the Commission’s prior approval.
Regarding the relationship between the Agency and third countries, a change
potentially increasing democratic accountability for the Agency’s international
cooperation actions consists of the duty to inform the EP before concluding a
working arrangement. Furthermore, the new legal framework seeks to enhance
consistency of Agency’s international actions with the EU external action, by
inserting a duty of coordination with EU delegations.
4.1[a][iii] Europol
The legal framework for Europol’s international cooperation activities was pro-
vided primarily by Article 23 of the Europol Council Decision (ECD)62 comple-
mented by Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.63 Article 23(1) ECD stipulated
clearly that Europol’s international cooperation activities were instrumental to
the core mandate and tasks of the Agency. The only way for the Agency to
formalize its relationship with partners outside the EU was by concluding coop-
eration agreements. Exchange of information related to the areas of crime within
Europol’s mandate was the main concern of such instruments.64 Depending on the
information which could be exchanged under each type of instrument, a distinc-
tion between Europol’s operational and strategic agreements was introduced.65
The ECD provided two important limitations on Europol’s international coopera-
tion: (1) agreements could be concluded only with third countries and interna-
tional organizations put on a ‘list’ drawn up by the Council;66 (2) each Europol’s
agreement was subject to prior approval by the Council.
The New Europol Regulation67 substantively redesigns Europol’s interna-
tional dimension. First, there will no longer be Europol cooperation agreements.
of the Council and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, OJ L251/1 (2016).
62 Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 Establishing the European Police Office (Europol), OJ
L131/37 (2009).
63 Council Decision 2009/934/JHA of 30 November 2009 Adopting the Implementing Rules Governing
Europol’s Relations with Partners, Including the Exchange of Personal Data and Classified Information, OJ
L325/6 (2009).
64 Arts 23(3)–(9) ECD.
65 Council Decision 2009/ 934/JHA, supra n. 63, Arts 1(g) and (h).
66 The ‘list’ took the form of Council Decision 2009/935/JHA of 30 November 2009 Determining the List of
Third States and Organisations with Which Europol Shall Conclude Agreements, OJ L325/12 (2009).
67 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and Replacing and Repealing Council Decisions
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, OJ L135/53
(2016).
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Although Europol’s agreements concluded until 1 May 2017 are preserved, future
international agreements relevant for the Agency will be concluded according to
Article 218 TFEU.68 Second, Europol is still allowed to conclude working
arrangements and administrative arrangements. The working arrangements are
designed to cover cooperative relations, except for exchanges of personal data,
and are explicitly characterized as not being binding for the EU and the Member
States.69 Europol’s administrative arrangements are intended to implement ‘Article
218 TFEU’ agreements or the Commission’s ‘adequacy decisions’ regarding the
transfer of personal data, but unlike the working arrangements, nothing is men-
tioned about their legal nature.70 Third, scrutiny on Europol’s international coop-
eration is enhanced. A Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) bringing
together members of the EP and of national parliaments is established to monitor
Europol’s activities.71 Moreover, an obligation is placed on Europol to transmit to
JPSG various documents, including the administrative arrangements implementing
the Union’s international agreements or the Commission’s ‘adequacy decisions’.72
4.1[b] The Procedure for the Agencies’ International Formal Cooperation Instruments
4.1[b][i] EASA
EASA has put in place an internal procedure regarding the negotiation and
conclusion of its working arrangements.73 It provides for the Commission’s invol-
vement from the initiation phase, throughout the drafting and negotiation phase,
up to the stage the working arrangement is concluded. This reveals a much more
intensive level of involvement by the Commission than the formal prior approval
referred to in Article 27(2) of EASA Regulation.
4.1[b][ii] Frontex
The procedure under the former Frontex Regulation74 included a preparatory
phase in which the Executive Director produced a draft mandate for negotiation
68 Ibid., Art. 25.
69 Ibid., Art. 23(4).
70 Ibid., Art. 25(1).
71 Ibid., Art. 51(1).
72 Ibid., Art. 51(3).
73 EASA internal procedure for working arrangements, EASA PR.WARG, 00001-001, ‘Working
arrangements’, approved 19 Aug. 2012.
74 Art. 2 of Decision of the Management Board of Frontex 11/2006 of 1 Sept. 2006 laying down the
procedures for negotiating and concluding working arrangements with third countries and interna-
tional organizations.
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with the international partner concerned, after consultations with the Commission
and the Member States (in case of third countries). Then, the Management Board
approved the draft mandate, including the guidelines that had to be observed
during the negotiation process. When a draft working arrangement had been
agreed upon by the parties, the Executive Director had to ask for the
Commission’s opinion. Next, the draft working arrangement was submitted to
the Management Board for adoption, and signed by the Executive Director.
Frontex’s Management Board adopted new Rules of Procedure adjusting the
procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of working arrangements in light of the
NewFrontexRegulation. TheNewRules of Procedure75 lay down amore simplified
formal procedure, which comprises the following steps: (1) the Executive Director
must inform the Management Board of its intention to negotiate a working arrange-
ment; (2) after negotiations and before submitting the working arrangement to the
Management Board, the Executive Director must seek Commission’s approval and
inform the EP; (3) approval of the working arrangement by the Management Board;
(4) signing of the working arrangement by the Executive Director.
4.1[b][iii] Europol
Essential procedural aspects regarding Europol’s international agreements were
mentioned in Article 23 ECD, but details of the full cycle were listed in Articles
5–6 of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA. The procedure included the following
milestones with regard to all Europol’s agreements:
– the negotiations with a third country or international organization
included on the Council’s ‘list’ were carried out by the Executive
Director;76
– the Executive Director had to submit the draft agreement to the
Management Board for endorsement;77
– the draft agreement endorsed by the Management Board was submitted
to the Council for approval;78
– the agreement was signed by the Executive Director after Council’s
approval.79
75 Art. 19 of Management Board Decision 11/2017 of 30 Mar. 2017 adopting the Rules of Procedures of
the Management Board. The New Rules of Procedure repealed Management Board Decision 11/
2006 laying down the procedures for negotiating and concluding working arrangements with third
countries and international organizations.
76 Council Decision 2009/934/JHA, supra n. 63, Arts 6(1) and (2).
77 Ibid., Art. 6(3).
78 Ibid., Art. 6(4).
79 Ibid. Currently, the approval takes the shape of a Council implementing decision.
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Regarding specifically the operational agreements, before initiating negotiations,
Europol had to carry out ‘an assessment of the existence of an adequate level of
data protection ensured by the third party’.80 The Joint Supervisory Body (JSB)81
was called to issue an opinion on this assessment before the Management Board
authorized the Executive Director to start negotiations.82 After negotiations, the
Management Board asked again for the opinion of the JSB on the draft agreement.83
Unlike the ECD, the New Regulation does not provide details regarding the
procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of Europol’s working and adminis-
trative arrangements, except that the Management Board decides on the conclu-
sion of such instruments, and that the Executive Director must inform the
Management Board on the intention to initial such arrangements.84
4.2 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION IN PRACTICE
4.2[a] Setting the International Cooperation Priorities and Actions
4.2[a][i] EASA
EASA documents, such as the five-year business plans and the annual work
programmes, touch upon the Agency’s international cooperation. Additionally,
EASA internal documents set more detailed priorities and roadmaps with regard to
third countries and international organizations.85 These documents are sent to the
Commission (DG MOVE), which provides its view especially from the wider
perspective of the Union’s aviation and external relation policies. The general line
is that EASA’s international cooperation strategy needs to fit with the political lines
adopted by the Commission.86 Hence, EASA does not enjoy full independence in
setting and pursuing its international cooperation strategy, but it is dependent in
particular on the Commission.
4.2[a][ii] Frontex
The strategic planning of Frontex’s international cooperation can be described as a mix
of operational needs and wider policy-political considerations. From the technical-
80 Ibid., Art. 5(4).
81 Europol’s former data protection control authority.
82 Council Decision 2009/934/JHA, supra n. 63, Art. 6(1).
83 Ibid., Art. 6(3).
84 Arts 11(1)(r) and 23(3) of Regulation 2016/794, supra n. 67.
85 Interview with EASA officials on 13 May 2013 (Brussels).
86 Interview with EASA officials on 7 Nov. 2012 (Cologne).
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operational perspective, the priorities for international cooperation are said to bemainly
risk-analysis driven. From the policy-political side, the main priorities regarding inter-
national cooperation are set based on a wider scale, in the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice (AFSJ) or in the EU external relations area and involves different actors, such
as the Member States, the Council, and the Commission (interview by phone with a
Frontex official on 27 November 2012). Thus, the degree of independence enjoyed by
the Agency looks rather limited, and it seems heavily dependent on other EU actors, in
particular the Commission and the Member States.
4.2[a][iii] Europol
According to an Europol official, the overall planning of Europol’s international
cooperation priorities can be depicted as mainly being operationally-driven, but
also subject to policy-political influences (interview on 29 January 2013, The
Hague). Though driven mostly by operational needs, setting the Agency’s prio-
rities was tightly restricted and controlled by the Council and the Member States
via the Management Board. Furthermore, Europol’s priorities regarding interna-
tional cooperation need to be consistent with the Union’s operational and political
needs and priorities.87 Under the New Europol Regulation, it is mainly the
Commission which seeks to secure that Europol takes into account the Union’s
position and priorities, and it may also review Agency’s cooperation agreements
with a view to replace them with ‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements.
4.2[b] International Cooperation Instruments
4.2[b][i] EASA
In practice, almost all working arrangements concluded by EASA are with com-
petent third country authorities.88 The numerous working arrangements entered
into by EASA are characterized by a certain degree of heterogeneity determined by
the Agency’s tasks, the international cooperation needs and priorities of EASA, and
the wider EU international cooperation framework with certain countries. One
may however roughly distinguish between working arrangements concluded (1)
with relevant aviation authorities from non-EU European countries, and (2) with
third countries worldwide. EASA has sought to conclude two types of working
arrangements with non-EU European countries:89 (1) on the collection and
87 Europol External Strategy 2010–2014, EDOC # 434663, 3 (2010).
88 EASA/Working Arrangements, http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/international-cooperation-working-
arrangements.php.
89 Also referred to as PANEP or Pan-European partner countries.
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exchange of information on aircraft safety, for implementing the Safety Assessment
of Foreign Aircraft (SAFA) Programme managed by EASA, and (2) on regulatory
cooperation and standardization. Worldwide, EASA has concluded working
arrangements with Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand, Asian countries
(China, Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, Taipei), Morocco, Israel, Saudi
Arabia and United Arab Emirates, covering issues such as exchange of safety
information and validation of type certificates and design approvals.
A common feature of EASA’s working arrangements is the widespread use of
the words ‘Party’ or ‘Contracting Party’ and of ‘will/shall’ clauses.
The working arrangements include as a rule detailed procedures, the activities
performed and the responsibilities undertaken by the parties. Within these general
lines, there is some differentiation among the working arrangements, depending on
the particular scope and objectives of the cooperation. The working arrangements
pertaining to certification issues routinely include detailed provisions regarding the
procedure under which one competent authority validates or accepts the type
certificates issued by the other competent authority on aircraft, parts and appli-
ances. These certification procedures often include specific rights and duties for
third parties, labelled as ‘the applicant’, ‘the type certificate holder’, ‘the manufac-
turer’. The working arrangements regarding the ‘standardization’ of the PANEP
countries are mainly concerned with the adoption and implementation of EU
safety standards by these countries. The SAFA working arrangements address issues
related to the nature and form of the exchange of information within the SAFA
programme, as well as confidentiality duties in handling information.
The final provisions of EASA’s working arrangements cover the entry into
force, amendment procedure and termination of the cooperation instrument, the
interpretation of its provisions, and the procedure for solving disagreements and
conflicts.
4.2[b][ii] Frontex
Frontex concluded more than twenty working arrangements with third countries
(Type 1)90 and with international organizations (Type 2).91 Frontex’s working
arrangements are rather brief documents. The preamble of some working arrange-
ments includes a formulation according to which Frontex and the partner
90 E.g. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Albania, USA, Montenegro, Belarus, Canada, Cape Verde, Nigeria,
Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Frontex/Partners/Third countries, http://frontex.europa.eu/
partners/third-countries/. The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 working arrangements is based
on information regarding the use of two different templates in practice by the Agency (Interview by
phone with a Frontex official on 27 Nov.. 2012).
91 E.g. UNHCR, Interpol, UNODC.
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organization or third country authority ‘agree’ to establish operational
cooperation.92 Type 1 working arrangements feature provisions characterized by
the use of ‘may’ in combination with ‘will’ clauses, whilst Type 2 working
arrangements are characterized by a more extensive use of ‘will/shall/must’ clauses.
Type 1 working arrangements normally list the following core areas of
cooperation: risk analysis, training, research and development, joint operations,
and operational interoperability. The practical modalities for implementing the
cooperation between the parties cover exchanges of information, exchange of
analytical products and training tools, exchanges of best practices, the participation
of observers from one competent authority in various activities of the other
authority, participation in various projects launched by Frontex. Some working
arrangements93 include provisions regarding the financial aspects of the coopera-
tion between the Agency and its counterpart. Type 2 working arrangements allow
for information exchanges, including confidential data, but personal data is
excluded from the scope of cooperation.
The final provisions of all Frontex working arrangements cover the entry into
force, amendment procedure and the termination of the cooperation instrument,
the interpretation of the instrument, and the procedure for solving disagreements.
Importantly, Type 1 working arrangements include a standard provision that they
are not to be considered an international treaty and that their implementation shall
not be regarded as the fulfilment of international obligations by the EU, its
institutions and its Member States.
4.2[b][iii] Europol
Europol has currently eighteen operational agreements (seventeen with third
countries94 and one with Interpol) and eight strategic agreements (six with third
countries95 and the remaining two with UNODC and WCO). The scope of
Europol’s strategic agreements is more limited in that they allow for the
exchange of information, except for personal data, while operational agree-
ments also cover personal data.
Both strategic and operational agreements feature prescriptive ‘shall/will’
clauses. The core part of the agreements deals mostly with the exchange of
information including confidentiality duties. Importantly, the agreements
92 E.g. Nigeria, Cape Verde, Interpol.
93 E.g. Turkey, Nigeria, Cape Verde, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, USA.
94 Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Colombia, Georgia, Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (FYROM), Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia,
Switzerland, Ukraine, USA (2002).
95 Brazil, China, Russian Federation, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, USA (2001).
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provide for the possibility to assign liaison officers. The final provisions of the
strategic agreements usually cover dispute settlement, amendment procedures,
entry into force, termination of the agreement, and the relationship with other
international instruments. The operational agreements include detailed provi-
sions concerning the exchange, processing and handling of personal data, and lay
down a right for individuals to have access to personal data concerning them.
Additionally, these agreements comprise provisions on liability for damages
caused to individuals resulting from errors in the exchange and processing of
personal data.
5 CROSS-CASE STUDY FINDINGS
The international dimension of the agencies examined seems instrumental to
their core mandate and at the same time embedded in the external dimension
of the relevant EU policies. Whilst all three agencies appear to have a certain
degree of autonomy in setting priorities and planning actions in the area of
international cooperation, in doing so they may not ignore the wider EU
policy directions in the external action area. Although there are some differ-
ences between the agencies examined, it appears that in all cases the controls
and monitoring mechanisms put in place are capable of ensuring overall that
the agency’s international cooperation is consistent with the Union’s external
relations policy.
The working arrangements and agreements concluded by EASA, Frontex
and Europol are regarded by the EU agencies as forms of international coop-
eration, although of a practical and technical nature and sometimes not at the
same level as a ‘treaty’. However, the analysis of the content, wording and
structure of the international cooperation instruments concluded by EASA,
Frontex and Europol reveals that they can be qualified as binding agreements
or, at least, as including limited substantive and procedural obligations.
In the case of Europol’s cooperation agreements, there are no difficulties in
general in considering these instruments as binding international agreements.
This will change, however, under the New Europol Regulation replacing
Europol’s cooperation agreements with working and administrative arrange-
ments. EASA’s working arrangements pertaining to cooperation with regard to
certification and design approvals are the most obvious examples of the
Agency’s binding agreements, whereas other working arrangements seem to
include at least limited procedural and substantive obligations. Frontex’s work-
ing arrangements suggest quite a low-level cooperation. In particular, the
working arrangements with the competent authorities of third countries
bespeak the concern to avoid taking these instruments as binding international
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE EU AGENCIES 115
agreements. Yet the overall analysis of the wording and content of Frontex’s
working arrangements suggests that they are still capable of giving rise to
limited legal rights and obligations, though most of these rights and duties
would become active upon the conclusion of subsequent agreements.
The procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of EU agencies’ interna-
tional cooperation instruments lends further support to the view that these are
considered as more than mere non-binding instruments. EASA, Frontex and
Europol have quite complex and formalized procedures, and in practice, the
initiation, negotiations and conclusion of these instruments take a significant period
of time. One may assume that these agencies do not enter into long negotiations
and complex procedures solely to attain something which does not involve any
commitment on behalf of the parties.96
The overall analysis of the working arrangements concluded by EASA and
Frontex, as well as of Europol’s agreements, allows concluding that these instru-
ments provide a very specific framework for technical and operational coopera-
tion, and are intended to enable the respective agency to implement its
regulatory framework. In line with the distinction made in section 2 between
the so-called ‘legislative’ external action and administrative external action, these
international cooperation instruments are included in the category of interna-
tional agreements of a ‘technical-administrative’ nature. Such agreements do not
necessarily affect the institutional balance in external relations, as long as they stay
outside the scope of Article 218 TFEU, comply with ‘Article 218’ agreements
and with the EU legislation, do not entrench on the Commission’s powers under
Articles 17 TEU and 220 TFEU, and there are sufficient controls and supervision
according to Meroni.
Our analysis suggests that the formal international cooperation instruments
concluded by EASA, Frontex and Europol comply overall with the above-
mentioned parameters. The initiation, negotiation and conclusion of EASA’s
working arrangements appear to be steered closely by the Commission.
Regarding Frontex’s working arrangements, the Commission was involved
throughout the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion, and had a
much more authoritative position than the consultative role formally provided
for in the former Frontex Regulation. Regulation 2016/1624 aligns formally
Frontex with EASA by imposing Commission’s approval for all Frontex’s
working arrangements. Europol’s agreements have been subjected to strict
formal controls by the Council. Furthermore, the involvement of the
Commission in Europol’s international cooperation has increased over time,
and has been further upgraded by the New Europol Regulation. Strikingly, the
96 See J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law 256 (Kluwer 1996).
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New Regulation is elliptical as regards the involvement of the Council, the
Commission and the EP in the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of
Europol’s international cooperation instruments which raises questions about
the sufficiency of controlling mechanisms by the main EU institutions in light
of Meroni. Conversely, the New Europol Regulation and the New Frontex
Regulation mark a tendency towards increased parliamentary oversight over
EU agencies’ international activities.
None of the three agencies examined displayed sufficient autonomy in pursu-
ing its international cooperation so as to acquire its own international legal
personality. In spite of some variations, all three agencies are subject to a plethora
of formal and informal conditions and controls which significantly limit their
discretion in pursuing international cooperation. As an immediate consequence,
the actions of EASA, Frontex and Europol on the international plane are per-
formed ultimately on behalf of the EU. In this regard, paragraph 25 of the
‘Common Approach’ stating that EU agencies cannot commit the Union to
binding obligations is not accurate, as it ignores the international law perspective
which may lead to a different outcome.
6 CONCLUSION
The institutional balance in EU external relations does not prohibit entrusting
certain international cooperation tasks to EU agencies, though the application
of the Meroni requirements suggests a limited role for the EU agencies as global
actors. Nonetheless, it is maintained that the international cooperation instru-
ments concluded by EU agencies can qualify as legally binding agreements from
an international law perspective. In this respect, delineating between ‘technical-
administrative’ agreements as forms of EU external administrative action and
the Union’s ‘politically significant’ agreements based on Article 218 TFEU
could render EU agencies’ legally binding agreements compatible with the
Union’s constitutional framework. Consequently, EU agencies’ binding inter-
national cooperation instruments as a specific category of technical-administra-
tive agreements can be accommodated within the EU legal framework and are
valid if they meet certain conditions. Finally, while the possibility for EU
agencies to acquire a derived and functionally limited international legal per-
sonality should not be excluded per se, none of the three agencies examined
through the case studies has such a legal status. As a result, more often than not,
EU agencies are acting as technical bodies of the EU on the international plane,
entailing that their international cooperation actions are in principle attributable
to the Union. Yet within the Union, the ultimate political responsibility of
agencies’ technical external actions seems to lie mainly with the Commission,
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considering the role of agencies as tools contributing to the implementation of
EU policies, the role of the Commission as a manager of Union’s external
administrative action, as well as the relationship between the Commission and
the EU ‘decentralized agencies’ enshrined in the ‘Common Approach’ and
further carved in the legal design of these bodies and through institutional
practice. Things are perhaps less obvious in the case of Europol, where the
Council still exercises important powers such as appointing the Executive
Director,97 and requesting the Commission, where necessary for the perfor-
mance of Agency’s tasks, to adopt an ‘adequacy decision’ or to initiate ‘Article
218 TFEU’ agreements.98
97 Regulation 2016/794, supra n. 67, Art. 11(1)(j).
98 Ibid., Art. 11(2).
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